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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs Lon S. Nield and Patricia L. Nield ("Nields")
and V. Mark Peterson and Nancy L. Peterson ("Petersons") initiated
this action against petitioners Rone, Gregg and Bieber, seeking to
permanently enjoin the efforts of Rone, Gregg and Bieber to
foreclose on the Nield and Peterson homes pursuant to certain
purported judgment liens. Rone, Gregg and Bieber counterclaimed,
seeking enforcement of their purported judgment liens. Rone, Gregg
and Bieber also filed a third-party complaint asserting various
claims against additional parties.
The trial court entered partial summary judgment in favor
of the Nields and Petersons in August, 1989, permanently enjoining
Rone, Gregg and Bieber from attempts to foreclose on the Nield and
Peterson homes.

This ruling was certified as a final judgment

pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, This
judgment was affirmed by the Utah Court of Appeals, under its Rule
31 calendar, on January 28, 1991. Petitioners thereupon filed this
Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
The relevant facts underlying this litigation are as
follows:
In 1983, Rone, Gregg and Bieber each initiated actions
in the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County, State of
Utah, against Fred and Kurt Vreeken ("Vreekens") and a number of
entities alleged to be fictitious names or sole proprietorships of
the Vreekens.

In each case, Rone, Gregg and Bieber alleged that

the Vreekens had defrauded Rone, Gregg and Bieber of investments
made with the Vreekens.

In each case, Rone, Gregg and Bieber

entered default judgment against several of the entities named as

defendants, but no judgment has ever been entered as to the
remaining defendants in any of the three actions,

[See R.

256-

57, 273-74, and 295-96.]
On May 1, 1984, Judge Ballif of the Fourth District Court
ruled that Rone had not properly effected service of process on the
defendants in Rone's action. Thus, Rone's default judgment in that
action was invalid.
affirmed

by

the

[R. 259-64.]

Utah

Court

of

Judge Ballif»s ruling was
Appeals

in

May,

1988,

in

Demetropoulos v. Vreeken. 754 P. 2d 960 (Utah Ct. App.), cert,
denied 765 P.2d 1278 (1988)1.
On September 15, 1987, three years after Judge Ballif
had held Rone's default judgment to be invalid, Rone, Gregg and
Bieber caused the clerk of the Fourth Judicial District Court of
Utah County, Utah, to issue executions under the Rone, Gregg and
Bieber judgments against, among other things, the homes of the
Nields and the Petersons.

[R. 353-58.] Neither the Nields nor the

Petersons had been named as parties to the lawsuits initiated
against the Vreekens by Rone, Gregg and Bieber.

The Nields and

Petersons are not named as judgment debtors in the Rone, Gregg and
Bieber judgments.

Utah County records do not reflect that the

Vreekens have ever held an interest in the Nield and Peterson
properties, nor do Utah County records show that any of the parties

1

Petitioners have attached to their brief relevant orders and
rulings as required by Rule 49(a) (10) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure. The Nields and Petersons, therefore, have not
duplicated that effort. Petitioners have, however, included only
a partial copy of the Demetropoulos v. Vreeken opinion in their
Appendix. The full text of that decision is set forth in the
Appendix to this brief.
-2-

named in the Rone, Gregg and Bieber lawsuits have ever held an
interest in the Nield and Peterson properties,

[R. 317-22.]

Indeed, at the initiation of Rone's lawsuit, Rone's attorney
submitted an affidavit to the court in support of Rone's petition
for a pre-judgment writ of attachment.

In this affidavit, Rone's

attorney attested that his examination of Utah County records
revealed

that

none of the

individuals

or entities named as

defendants in Rone's action owned any real property in Utah County.
[R. 432-37.]

Until the Utah County Sheriff posted notices of a

sheriff's sale on the doors to their homes, the Nields and
Petersons had no knowledge of the Vreekens' business dealings or
the Rone, Gregg and Bieber judgments.
In

seeking

to

enjoin

[R. 325-27; 349-51.]

Rone, Gregg

and

Bieber from

foreclosing upon their homes, the Nields and Petersons argued that:
(1) the Rone, Gregg and Bieber judgments were not valid because
Rone, Gregg and Bieber failed to effect service of process as
required under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; and (2) the Rone,
Gregg and Bieber judgments were not final judgments and, therefore,
gave rise to no judgment liens against any real property, including
the homes of the Nields and Petersons. When Rone, Gregg and Bieber
appealed the summary judgment against them to the Utah Court of
Appeals, the Nields and Petersons moved the Court of Appeals to
award them fees and costs incurred in the appeal because the Rone,
Gregg and Bieber appeal was frivolous.

The Utah Court of Appeals

agreed, and awarded these fees and costs to the Nields and
Petersons.

-3-

ARGUMENT
In their Brief of Respondents to the Court of Appeals,
the Nields and Petersons analyzed in detail the reasons why the
district court properly granted summary judgment in their favor.
That brief, likewise, contains a detailed stateiaent of the reasons
why an award of costs of fees in favor of the Nields and Petersons
was appropriate.

The Nields and Petersons will not, therefore,

repeat that analysis, but instead will provide this Court with only
a brief summary of these reasons and urge the Court to consult
respondents1 brief in the court below if the Court desires a fuller
analysis of the issues.
I.

ISSUES SURROUNDING THE VREEKENS• USE OF
PSEUDONYMS ARE IRRELEVANT TO THIS LITIGATION.

Throughout this litigation, Rone, Gregg and Bieber have
made a variety

of arguments regarding

pseudonyms in their business dealings.

the Vreekens' use of
[Brief of Petitioner, at

7-11, 15-17.] The point of those arguments has rarely been clear.
Whether the Vreekens used a variety of false identities in order
to defraud investors is simply irrelevant to the question of
whether Rone, Gregg and Bieber have secured valid and final
judgments against anyone that would allow them to execute on
property allegedly owned by the Vreekens. Certainly, any relevant
issues relating to the Vreekens1 use of false identities should be
raised by Rone, Gregg and Bieber

in litigcition against the

Vreekens, rather than in litigation against innocent third parties
such as the Nields and Petersons. However, petitioners have never
bothered to secure judgments against the Vreekens.
-4-

II.

THE RONE, GREGG AND BIEBER JUDGMENTS
ARE NOT VALID JUDGMENTS.

The Rone judgment was declared invalid by Judge Ballif
of the Fourth District in 1984, a judgment that was affirmed by the
Utah Court of Appeals in Demetropoulos v. Vreeken. 754 P.2d 960
(Utah Ct. App.) cert, denied. 765 P.2d 1278, (1988).

Thus, this

state's highest courts have already ruled that the Rone judgment
is invalid.

It is simply incredible that in defiance of these

rulings, Rone has attempted to enforce that judgment by foreclosing
on the homes of innocent third parties and continues to demand
relitigation on this issue.

[Brief of Petitioner, at 11.]

The reasons why service of process was defective in the
Rone case have been described in detail in the Court of Appeals'
opinion in Demetropoulos v. Vreeken.

Exactly the same factual

defects exist with respect to service of process in the Gregg and
Bieber cases.

The same constable effected service of process in

each case, and in each case, the constable determined that service
would be made on Keith or Chris Vreeken as agents for the entities
named in the complaints, based on the constable's guess that Keith
and Chris Vreeken were somehow connected with Fred Vreeken's
business.

[R. 1201-25.] A judgment, final after appeal, has been

rendered in the Rone case that the constable's guess that an
individual was somehow involved in a business is insufficient to
establish that individual as a proper agent for service of process.
Exactly the same record exists regarding service of process in the
Gregg and Bieber actions.

-5-

In sum, the Utah Court of Appeals committed no error that
would call for this Court's review in affirming that service of
process was not effectively made in any of the Rone, Gregg or
Bieber lawsuits and that Rone, Gregg and Bieber do not, therefore,
have valid judgments that would support their execution efforts.
III.

THE RONE, GREGG AND BIEBER JUDGMENTS
ARE NOT FINAL JUDGMENTS.

Under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
a judgment is not final unless it resolves all claims against all
parties, unless a judgment against less than all parties or as to
less than all claims has been certified as final pursuant to Rule
54(b).

Kennedy v. New Era Industries, Inc.. 600 P.2d 534, 536-37

(Utah 1979).

It is undisputed that the Rone, Gregg and Bieber

default judgments were judgments entered as to less than all
parties and that those judgments were not certified pursuant to
Rule 54(b).
Courts have uniformly held that a judgment as to less
than all claims or all parties that has not been certified as final
pursuant to Rule 54(b), does not permit execution on the judgment
and does not give rise to a judgment lien. Bank of Lincolnwood v.
Federal Leasing. Inc.. 622 F.2d 944, 951 (7th Cir. 1980); Redding
& Co. v. Russwine Construction Corp., 417 F.2d 721, 727 (D.C. Cir.
1969); Gauthier v. Crosby Marine Service. Inc.. 590 F. Supp. 171,
176 (E.D. La. 1984); City of Salina v. Star B. Inc.. 11 Kan. App.
2d 639, 731 P.2d 1290, 1294, aff'd, 739 P.2d 933 (Kan. 1987);
Arizona Farmers Prod. Credit Ass'n. v. Stewart Title & Trust of
Tucson. 24 Ariz. App. 5, 535 P.2d 33, 35 (1975).
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Petitioners have

presented no contrary authority that would suggest that a judgment
that does not satisfy the finality requirements of Rule 54(b) is
enforceable.

Thus, the Court of Appeals committed no error in

affirming that the Rone, Gregg and Bieber judgments are not final
judgments and gave rise to no judgment liens that would allow Rone,
Gregg and Bieber to execute against the Nield and Peterson homes.
IV.

THE RONE, GREGG AND BIEBER APPEAL REMAINS FRIVOLOUS
AND WARRANTS A CONTINUED IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.
The Utah Court of Appeals concluded that the Rone, Gregg

and Bieber appeal was so lacking in merit that Rone, Gregg and
Bieber, rather than the Nields and Petersons, should bear the
expenses incurred by the Nields and Petersons in the appeal.

In

their appeal to this Court, Rone, Gregg and Bieber accuse the Court
of Appeals panel with a "nonchalant" attitude toward the appeal and
"ignorance" of the briefs. [Brief of Petitioner, at 32-33.] These
charges are unsubstantiated, and improperly demean both the Court
and counsel. Rone, Gregg and Bieber point to no specifics in which
they believe the Court of Appeals erred in awarding fees and costs.
The brief summary of arguments provided above hopefully
demonstrates that the positions adopted by Rone, Gregg and Bieber
in this litigation are without legal merit.

Indeed, the attempt

of Rone to collect a judgment from innocent third parties in
defiance of the fact that the courts of this state have declared
his judgment to be invalid constitutes the clearest possible abuse
of the judicial system.
The appeal of Rone, Gregg and Bieber to the Utah Court
of Appeals was without merit, the Utah Court of Appeals so held

-7-

and,

therefore, awarded

the Nields

and

attorney's fees incurred in that appeal.

Petersons

costs and

The case of Rone, Gregg

and Bieber has gained no merit in being pressed one more level to
an appeal before this Court. The Nields and Petersons, therefore,
respectfully move this Court to deny Rone's, Gregg's and Bieber's
Petition for Writ of Certiorari and to award the Nields and
Petersons their costs and attorney's fees incurred in preparing
this reply brief on the ground that the Rone, Gregg and Bieber
appeal continues to be without merit.
CONCLUSION
The Nields and Petersons respectfully request this Court
to

deny

Rone's, Gregg's

and

Bieber's

Petition

for Writ of

Certiorari. The ruling of the Utah Court of Appeals that the Rone,
Gregg and Bieber judgments are not valid or final and can,
therefore, support no judgment liens against the Nield and Peterson
homes was clearly correct.

The merits of the case are so clear

that the Court of Appeals likewise correctly concluded that an
imposition of sanctions under Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure was appropriate.

Finally, the Nields and

Petersons respectfully move this Court to confirm the judgment of
the Court of Appeals by awarding further sanctions under Rule 33
to reimburse the Nields and Petersons for their fees and costs
incurred in the preparation of this brief.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

I 4*
"

day of May, 1991.

KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE

^m.JLjl Lzfcz

MICHAEL M. LATER
Attorneys for Respondents
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Dale and Kathy
DEMETROPOULOS, Plaintiffs,
v.

Fred VREEKEN, et alM Defendants.
Deseret Bank, Garnishee.
BJ. RONE, Plaintiff in Intervention
and Appellant,
v.

Dale and Kathy DEMETROPOULOS,
Defendants in Intervention and
Respondents.
No. 860031-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
May 11, 1988.
Creditors disputed relative priority of
their prejudgment writs of attachment and
garnishment The Fourth District Court,
Utah County, George F. Ballif, J., held for
first creditor, and appeal was taken. The
Court of Appeals, Orme, J., held that even
if judgment creditors1 prejudgment writ of
attachment was invalid, their postjudgment
writ of garnishment had priority over second creditor's prejudgment writ of garnishment where second creditor's judgment
against debtors was invalid for lack of jurisdiction due to insufficiency of service of
process.
Affirmed*
Jackson, J., concurred and filed opinion*
1. Appeal and Error * W t
Court of Appeals would reach merits
of appeal notwithstanding inadequacies of
appellants brief. Court of Appeals Rule
24(k).
1. "Inadequate sppellate briefs whkh do not significantly assist the Court in disposing of the
case before it have proven to be s significant
problem. In order to alleviate this concent this
Rule clearly specifies the required contents and
order of each brief." Utah ILAppJ1. 24 advisory
committee note. Sm Note 3, infra.
2. "It may be said that a brief is as effective as it
is helpful in deciding the question or questions

2. Garnishment *=»107
Even if judgment creditors' p ^
ment writ of attachment was invalid th '"
postjudgment writ of garnishment h^d nl
ority over second creditor's prejudgm^
writ of garnishment for second creditor*
judgment against debtors was invalid to
lack of jurisdiction due to insufficiency 0f
service of process; second creditor's pr*
judgment writ of garnishment was provi.
sional remedy which did not itself entitle
second creditor to provisionally garnished
property. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 64D(a)(i)

George M. McCune, Salt Lake City, for
appellant, Rone.
Robert H. Wilde, Murray, for respondent, Demetropoulo8 Cook & Wilde.
Before ORME, JACKSON and
BILLINGS, JJ.
OPINION
ORME, Judge:
This case involves a dispute over the
validity of respondents1 prejudgment writ
of attachment and the priority of appellant's prejudgment writ of garnishment
Despite the inadequacy of appellant's brief,
we reach the merits of his appeal and affirm.
INADEQUACY OP
APPELLANTS BRIEF
While numerous issues are raised on appeal, appellant's brief has not been of much
help to the court in disposing of the esse
before it 1 The purpose of a brief is to
enlighten the court and elucidate the issues
rather than confuse the court and obscure
the issues.1 In this respect, one court has
presented. Hence, the crucial importance of
properly phrasing or stating the question or
issue raised on the appeal cannot be overemphasized. By a proper presentation of pertinent
authority, counsel should demonstrate and persuade the court that the answer submitted in the
brief is warranted if not absolutely required by
the governing principles of law." Re, Effvm*

DEMETROPOULOS v. VREEKEN
Cite a* 734 ?2d 9*0 (UuJiApp. 198S)

observed that "p]f the court is not supplied
with the proper tools to decide cases, then
exjemely valuable time, already severely
rationed, must be diverted from substanUve work mto ess productive tasks.
Kushner v. Wxnterthur Swiss Ins. Co., 620
F2d 404 407 (3d f ir 1<HW»
F.2d 404, 407 (3d Cir.1980).
Counsel should be aware that appellate
courts
are about
beginning
to overcome
trepidation
dismissing
appeals their
and
imposing sanctions for failure to comply
with these procedures. For example, the
court in Kushner, while acknowledging the
"institutional" and "precedential" impact
of its decision, found that counsel's "refusal, failure or unwillingness to master [the
court's] procedures" necessarily required
dismissal of the appeal and imposition of
sanctions for failure to file an appendix in
conformity with court rules. Id. at 407.
More recently, this court chose to disregard
an inadequate brief and premised its affirmance, in part, on the failure of the brief
to comply with our rules. Koulis v. Standard Oil Co., 746 P.2d 1182, 1185 (Utah
CtApp.1987).
The Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals
set forth the general requirements to be
observed by litigants bringing appeals in
this court Rule 24(k)s requires that all
briefs "be concise, presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings, and free from burdensome, irrelevant,
immaterial or scandalous matters/9 While
appellant's brief is free from "scandalous
matters/' it is not concise, logically arranged, or free from burdensome material.
Appellant's brief begins with a laborious,
ten-page Statement of Facts. The stateLegal Writing and the AppaUat* Brief, Case 4
Comment, July-Aug. 1984, at 9, 18.
3. Although our citations are to Rule 24 of the
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, effective
January 13, 1987, that rule does not differ from
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, effective January 1.1985. While it is true
that appellant's brief was filed a few weeks
before the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
went into effect, it is also true that the problems
inherent in the transition from the prior rules to
the new appellate rules were anticipated It
was intended that "unless there is substantial
prejudice in a particular case which results
from the application of or compliance with
these Rules, the Rules shall govern as of the

Utah 961

ment of facts is little more than a catalogue of each pleading and paper generated by the parties or the court, regardless of
how inconsequential it might be, and a*
cor dingly the statement is burdened w£h
minuti* Th* *t*t*m*„f ^ ***.
.
minuaa. The statement of facts contains
unhelpful citations to the thousand-plus
page record, such as "See pleading entitled
Pre-judgment Writ of Garnishment with
answers to interrogatories dated April 25,
1983, in the court file" and "See entire
court file, 4- R169." Confusion is engendered in this multiparty case by inconsistent references to the parties—sometimes
by their names, sometimes by their designation at trial, and sometimes by their designation on appeal See R.Utah CtApp.
24(d).
The substance of appellant's first of nine
points, mercifully reduced from some twenty identified in his docketing statement, is
obscured within the 135 words it takes to
make it Point I, by no means unique
among appellant's points, is captioned as
follows:
DEMETROPOULOS' PRE-JUDGMENT
WRIT OF ATTACHMENT AND PROCEEDINGS THEREON WERE SUBSTANTIVELY
INCORRECT AND
VOID BECAUSE THE WRIT AND
PROCEEDINGS THEREON WERE UNAMENDABLY DEFECTIVE BECAUSE
A RETURN AND INVENTORY WAS
NOT FILED FOR 7 MONTHS INSTEAD
OF WITHIN 20 DAYS AS REQUIRED
BY RULE 64Cfli), A DETAILED INVENTORY WAS NOT FILED AS REQUIRED BY RULE 64Qh), THE SERVeffective date, all appellate procedure ... including cases presently in process." Utah
ILAppJ>., introductory note of Supreme Court
Advisory Committee on the Rules of Appellate
Procedure. While the new rules were not effective until January 1985, they were prepared in
draft form and circulated among the bar for
comment and information well in advance of
their effective date.
We acknowledge that under former Utah
R.Civ.P. 75<p), which was in effect when appellant's brief wasfiled,,the requirements for briefing were phrased somewhat differently. Nonetheless, even under rhat rule appellant's brief is
deficient
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ING OFFICER FAILED TO ASK FOR A
MEMORANDUM OF CREDITS ATTACHED AS REQUIRED BY RULE
64C(h), NO DEFENDANTS WERE
SERVED WITH PLEADINGS WITHIN
10 DAYS OF ISSUANCE OF THE PREJUDGMENT ATTACHMENT IN A
WAY ALLOWED BY RULE 4, AND
THE WRIT THEREFORE AUTOMATICALLY DIED A JUDICIAL DEATH AT
THE END OF ITS 10-DAY LIFE, AND
GARNISHMENT UNDER RULE 64D
WAS THE APPROPRIATE WRIT TO
ISSUE TO LIEN PROPERTY IN THE
HANDS OF THIRD PARTIES RATHER
THAN ATTACHMENT UNDER RULE
64C.
When Point I is dissected, it obviously concerns several issues. The argument under
Point I is a disjointed presentation of abstract legal doctrines pertaining to garnishment and attachment Cases are quoted
and checklists from legal encyclopedias
provided, with scant attention given to the
facts of the instant matter and no actual
analysis of those facts in light of the legal
authorities excerpted Appellant invites us
to draw what he apparently regards as
obvious conclusions, ending the argument
under Point I with: "In the instant case,
the Pre-judgment Writ of Attachment of
Respondents can not have survived all of
the above defects. The cites to the record
made in the Statement of Facts above
clearly shows that" Difficulty in following the argument is compounded by the
lack of a summary of arguments as required by Rule 24(aX8).4
4. Rule 24<»XS), Rules of the Utah Court of Ap*
peals, requires the brief of appellant to contain
"[a] summary of arguments. The summary of
arguments, suitably paragraphed, shall be a suecinct condensation of the arguments actually
made in the body of the brief. It shall not be a
mere repetition of the heading under which the
argument is arranged*

We concede that not every brief ffled •
in strict compliance with our rules. NorH
every brief we see, any more than every
opinion we write, a masterpiece of Ieg2
writing. Ordinarily, however, the briefs do
enable us to understand, with varying degrees of effort, what particular errors were
allegedly made, where in the record those
errors can be found, and why, under applj.
cable authorities, those errors are material
ones necessitating reversal or other relief.1
While appellant's task has no doubt been
complicated by the convoluted procedural
posture of the case, appellant's brief fails
to give us much help infindingthe keys to
understanding it 1
[1] Under Rule 24(k), briefs which are
not in compliance with the requirements of
our rule or are otherwise inadequate may
be disregarded or stricken by the court and
attorney fees can be imposed. Sympathetic to the Kushner court's view that
"[w]e can no longer afford the effort and
time to prepare counsels' case and to supply counsels' record deficiencies," 620 F.2d
at 407 (quoting United States v. Somen,
562 F.2d 108, 115 (3d Cir.1977)), when this
time can be "better spent in considering
the merits of cases that are presented to us
in proper form," 620 F.2d at 407, we have
considered dealing with the brief in one of
the ways provided in Rule 24(k). While we
can be expected to become less timid in this
regard over time—and as we recognize
that a brief which fails to do its job is, in a
sense, its own sanction—we decline to impose Rule 24(k) sanctions in this case and
turn to the merits of the appeaL7
6. Our confusion might have been alleviated
through oral argument, but no request was
made pursuant to ILUtah CtApp. 29(b) and so
argument held Nor did appellant submit a
reply brief which might also have clarified the
issues*

7. This approach is not inconsistent with this
court's disposition of Koulis v. Standard Oil Co,
746 PJd 1182 (Utah <XApp.l9S7). In KouUs, *
unanimous panel found appellant's brief inade5. Judge Re has noted in this respect that I t is
quate under Rule 24 and therefore determined
counsel's responsibility to point out the error
to "sua sponte disregard Koulis' brief on appeaL
and to demonstrate that it was reversible beWe also assume the correctness of the judgment
cause it affected the substantial rights of the
below, and find that Katherine Koulis ... has
appellant" Re, Effective Legal Writing and tha
failed to come forward with any legally cognizaAppellate Brief, Case and Comment, Juiy-Aug.
ble reason to excuse her delayed discovery of
1984, at 9, 18.

DEMETROPOULOS v. VREEKEN
C1UM7S4 P J d 940 (UtaJiitpp. 19SS)

MERITS OF APPEAL
Appellant has set forth various "facts"
in his brief. He has not, however, "marshalOed] all the evidence in support of the
trial court's findings and then demonstratefd] that even viewing it in the light
most favorable to the court below, the evidence is insufficient to support the findings." Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d
1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). Accordingly, "we
take as our starting point the trial court's
findings8 and not [appellant's] recitation of
the facts." Id
Respondents Dale and Kathy Demotropolous filed their action against various defendants and obtained a prejudgment writ
of attachment The same was served on
Deseret Bank on April 12, 1983, as Deseret
Bank held certain accounts in the names of
some of the defendants. Appellant BJ.
Rone, a creditor of some or all of these
same defendants, then filed his own civil
action and obtained a prejudgment writ of
garnishment He served the bank eleven
days later. Before respondents' writ expired, it was extended twice, the second
time indefinitely, "pending a request by the
Defendants to have the matter heard"
Respondents obtained judgment by default
against defendants and, in execution of the
judgment, promptly served the bank with a
post-judgment writ of garnishment Appellant obtained a default judgment in the
action he filed a few weeks later.
Appellant intervened in the action respondents filed to assert his entitlement to
the accounts*9 Intervention was denied by
the district court; but was subsequently
permitted pursuant to a writ of mandamus
issued by the Utah Supreme Court Appelthe alleged fraud19 UL at 1185. Nonetheless,
the panel was apparently not comfortable in
premising its affirmance solely on that ground
and went on to conclude that affirmance was
also warranted on statute of limitation grounds.
Id at 1185-86.
8. We do so only insofar as the findings of fact,
found both in the court's memorandum decision and its formal "Findings of Fact," are really
that Some of the "facts" set forth in the findings, prepared by respondents' counsel are actually conclusions of law or else so broadly
phrased as to be unhelpful. Finding #3, for
example, reads as follows: That the Plaintiffs'
Prejudgment Writ of Attachment was substan-
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lant's initial foray into the action was subsequently nullified because of his failure to
comply with Utah R.Civ.P. 24<c) following
issuance of the writ of mandamus. Various papers filed by him were stricken by

court order because he had not first filed «
complaint in intervention and paid the nee"
essary filing fee. These oversights were
ultimately corrected. The ancillary proceeding which was begun with appellant's
complaint in intervention ultimately culminated in a judgment dismissing that complaint. It is from that judgment that appellant Rone appeals.
[2] Appellant claims priority to the accounts in question due to various alleged
deficiencies in connection with respondents'
prejudgment writ of attachment Respondents strive to demonstrate that their prejudgment writ was proper in every material
respect, but also attack the validity of appellant's prejudgment writ of garnishment
and his default judgment Their basic position is that even if their prejudgment writ
was flawed, appellant's has come to have
no force or effect, leaving respondents'
post-judgment writ of garnishment the
first, clearly valid levy on the accounts held
by Deseret Bank.
The trial court's findings support the
conclusion that apipellanfs prejudgment
writ of garnishment does not have precedence over respondents' post-judgment writ
of garnishment, making it unnecessary for
us to decide whether respondents' prejudgment writ of attachment was valid
Appellant purported to serve the defendants he named in hiii action, including the
tively and procedurally proper and correct in all
relevant respects.
9. Appellant and respondents were victims of the
same investment scant It is regrettable that,
having both succeeded in finding a liquid asset
of defendants at about the same time, they were
unable to devise an equitable method of sharing
the prize rather than engaging in a costly, "winner-take-alT contest Astoundingiy, in view of
the modest size of the garnished accounts and
amounts invested, their procedural battles generated some seven hundred pages in court filings.
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defendants whose accounts were garnished, by service upon one Keith Vreeken,
who was not himself named as a defendant 1 * However, the court noted in its
memorandum decision that "[n]o proof exists in the record other than the constable's
guess that Keith Vreeken was the agent of
or had any managerial control for the business entities" whose accounts were seized.
The court formally found that Keith Vreeken was not "an officer, managing agent,
general agent or any other agent authorized to receive service for any relevant
Defendant herein nor that he was a clerk,
cashier, chief clerk [or] person having the
management, direction or control of any
property of any such Defendant" There is
adequate support in the record for this
finding. The defendants* in question were
found to be "sole proprietorships/' not corporations, and no assumed name certificates or filings of any sort had been made
concerning them. Thus, no public record
showed that Keith Vreeken was registered
agent for them or otherwise affiliated with
them. The bank's representative testified
that Keith Vreeken was not on the signature cards for the accounts, although others with that same last name apparently
were.11
Appellant disputes the finding concerning Keith Vreeken's status, but also contends that any problems with his service of
process on the defendants a n inconsequential since service of his prejudgment writ of
garnishment was duly made on the bank.
This fact does not save appellant A prejudgment writ of garnishment is a provisional remedy only, "available as a means

of attachment of intangible property

before judgment, in cases in which a writ
of attachment is available under Rule 64C "
Utah R.Civ.P. 64D<aXi). Such a prejudg.
ment writ merely commands the garnishee
to retain the property "until further order
of the court" Utah R.Civ.P. 64D(eXi).
Only if the plaintiff ultimately obtains a
valid judgment against the defendant is he
or she entitled to some or all of the provisionally garnished property.12 See Utah
R.Civ.P. 64D(j). See also Utah R.CivP
64C(k).
In this case, the court properly concluded
that the default judgment obtained by appellant in the action he filed was invalid for
lack of jurisdiction due to the insufficiency
of service of process on the defendants in
that action. The provisional remedy of a
prejudgment writ of garnishment in that
same action ceased to have any further
effect upon entry of that "judgment" ll and
could be properly disregarded by the court
in determining who was entitled to the
accounts, leaving respondents entitled to
the accounts pursuant to their post-judgment writ of garnishment
One further point raised by appellant
merits comment Appellant contends that
the court erred in not granting his post-trial motion to amend the return of service on
Keith Vreeken. It is suggested that if the
return were amended, it would demonstrate that service on the defendants was
actually proper, meaning appellant's judgment was valid and his prejudgment writ
entitled to recognition. We are not per-

10. Appellant named ss defendants Kurt Vreek- IX IGlarnishment to enforce a final judgment
should be distinguished from the provisional
en, an individual doing business under various
remedy
of garnishment before trial which i*
mtw%mA
names;
Fred
Vreeken,
an
individual
?f
aimed at preserving assets of the debtor until s
doing business under those same names; "busifinal decision can be had on the merits." D.
ness entities" corresponding to Kurt and Fred
Dobbs, R*m«H*t 11 (1973).
Vreeken's assumed names; John Andrews, Rick
Ramsey and Jerry Pitts, under various assumed 13. As provided in Rule 64A, appellant's prejudgnames; Financial Development Group, a busiment writ of garnishment recited that it would
ness entity; and "several John Does, whoee
expire in ten days from issuance unless extendnames are not yet known." The Deseret Bank
ed. Utah RXW.P. 64A(3). Defendants did not
accounts stood in the names under which Kurt
appear at the hearing on whether the writ
and Fred Vreeken allegedly did business.
should be continued and, accordingly, by order
entered at that bearing, the writ was continued
"in full force and effect during die pendency [of
11. It is worth noting diet one of them, Kurt
appellant's action] or until further order of the
Vreeken, had been served by the constable used
court"
by appellant on at least one prior occasion.
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suaded. Any error in disallowing the
amendment was harmless since the constable testified at length concerning the
circumstances of service on Keith Vreeken.
Accordingly, all relevant information was
before the court anyway. Moreover, we
find it difficult to see how appellant can
complain in this appeal about a ruling on a
motion that would have been properly
raised, if at all, in another action, namely
the one he brought and in which the return
was filed.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed.

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
Steven L. GRIFFIN, Defendant
and Appellant
No. 870108-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
May 16, 1988.

Defendant was convicted on two
counts of sexual abuse of a child following
trial in Third District Court, Salt Lake
BILLINGS, J., concurs.
County, Dean E. Conder, J., and he appealed. The Court of Appeals, Bench, J.,
JACKSON, Judge (concurring):
held that: (1) defendant did not waive obBy virtue of random case assignment, jections to second statement by stipulating
the burden of trying to make sense of the to its admission; (2) defendant's first stateappellants' briefs in this case and in Koulis ment was not taken in violation of his right
v. Standard Oil Co., 746 P.2d 1182 (Utah to counsel after arguably equivocal stateApp.1987), was cast upon me. No other ment as to whether he desired assistance of
judge of this court was honored with that counsel; but (3) manner of interrogation
dubious distinction. And I admit the likely utilized in taking first statement was so
existence of a cumulative effect upon me. egregious and coercive as to require supIn both cases, we have proceeded to decide pression; and (4) defendant did not make
the merits of the issues raised, in deference valid waiver of his rights prior to second
only to the parties and not to appellants1 interview.
counsel. Charles Dickens said that one
Reversed and remanded for new trial.
member of Parliament had a tolerable command of sentences with no meaning in
them. Appellate counsel must prepare and 1. Criminal Law ^1044.2(2)
Defendant was not required to renew
submit briefs that are more than mere
sound effects. The time will most assured- at trial his motion to suppress in order to
ly arrive when a panel of this court will be preserve issue on appeal where there had
constrained to disregard intolerable and un- been evidentiary hearing on suppression
acceptable briefs and not reach the merits motion before the same judge who presided
at trial
of the case.
2. Criminal Law *»8M
Defendant did not waive his objections
to admissibility of his second statement by
stipulating to its admission in light of his
pretrial suppression motion, initial objection at trial and continued assertion of
statement's inadmissibility throughout trial.
3. Criminal Law **1153<1)
Court of Appeals will not disturb trial
court's determination of suppression motion unless trial court, was clearly in error.
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